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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20 29 5 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the evidence supports a finding of 
conspiracy to defraud. 
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2. Whether the trial court erred by allowing the 
matter to go to the jury and not granting a directed verdict 
or judgment not withstanding the verdict in favor of the 
Appellant. 
3. Whether the trial court erred in its 
instructions to the jury, numbers 21, 26 and 27, wnere in 
the burden for finding punitive damages was stated to be by 
Mthe preponderance" of the evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff brought an action against each o£ 
the Defendants on the theory that they conspired to defraud 
him of his home. 
On August 21-23, 1984, the Plaintiff's action 
came on for trial before a jury in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. 
Dennis Fredrick presiding. The jury returned a verdict in 
favor of the Plaintiff and awarded both conpensatorv and 
punitive damages. After the verdict was returned, the 
Appellant's motions for directed verdict and for judgment 
notwithstandinq the verdict were considered resolved and 
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therefore denied. T. 421. Subsecruently, the judgment entered 
was appealed to this court. 
Sometime prior to August 18, 1980, the Plaintiff 
listed his property with Century 21~Harv Kirkpatrick for the 
sales price of $44,000. T. 84. Dorius Black, through Scott 
Peatross who was a real estate agent with Bill Brown Realty, 
presented an offer to the Plaintiff and his real estate 
agents, Vicki Phelps and Harv Kirkpatrick. T. 277. This 
offer, presented by way of an Ernest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase, provided for $20,000.00, including $1,000.00 
earnest money, to be paid to the Plaintiff at closing with 
the remaining $24,000 being deferred one year and paid over 
a two year period. E.23. T. 278. After some negotiation, the 
offer was accepted by the Plaintiff on July 30, 19R0. Those 
participating in the negotiations were the Plaintiff, 
through his interpreter, Emilio Ortiz; the Plaintiff's 
agents, Vicki Phelps and Harv Kirkpatrick; and Mr. Black and 
his agent Scott Peatross. T. 282, 286. 
Although Mr. Black negotiated the purchase of the 
home, he never intended to actually buy the home himself. T. 
19. During this time, he and Joseph Cannon had been involved 
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in several business deals together. Mr. Black looked for 
business opportunities which, with the help of Mr. Cannon's 
strong financial position, could be taken advantage of to 
increase and strengthen their respective business interests. 
T.19. Although not mentioning the Plaintiff by name, Mr. 
Black represented to Mr. Cannon that he had a project that 
would help him with his lease obligations to Alpha Leasing. 
T. 104. Mr. Cannon first met the Plaintiff at the time of 
closing at the offices o? Stewart Title. T.87. 
Also during this time, Mr. Black approached 
Capitol Thrift and Loan (the Appellant) about receiving a 
loan for the purchase of the home. T.21. The lender never 
met the Plaintiff. In fact, in making the loan, the lender 
was not involved with the Plaintiff as seller. T. 138, 309. 
As the value of the home appeared an acceptable risk for a 
loan, the lender indicated money could be made available. T. 
22. Other than providing the financing for the purchase of 
the home, the lender was not a party to the plans of Mr. 
Black and Mr. Cannon to purchase the home. T.50. 
Subsequently, Mr. Cannon filled out an 
application with the lender for a business loan to ourchase 
-5-
Plaintiff's property. T.120. Ex 34. Along with the 
application, Mr. Cannon provided a personal financial 
statement as well as a financial statement for Alpha Leasina 
Company, a partnership in which Mr. Cannon held a 
partnership interest T. 137 Ex. 35-36. An appraisal had 
earlier been done on the home and was verified by Merlyn 
Hanks, a loan officer for the lender. T. 137. Based on the 
value of the home and the financial strength of Mr. Cannon, 
the lender agreed to extend $32,325.00 to Mr. Cannon for the 
purchase of the home. 
Accordingly, on August 1R, 19 3C, the day 
appointed for closing, a check for that amount was delivered 
to Stewart Title Company with instruction? on how and when 
the check could be negotiated and disbursed. T. 139. Ex. 1. 
Mr. Cannon denied endorsing the check, but did acknowledge 
receiving the disbursements according to the instructions. 
T. 101. The letter of instructions required that fee simole 
title to the property be in the name of Joseph N. Cannon. 
The letter of instuctions also provided that a Trust Deed in 
favor of the Appellant be recorded as a first trust deed 
subject to no other liens or incumbrances. In addition, 
-6-
Stewart Title was instructed to disburse the funds as 
follows: (1) $4348.75, to Capitol Thrift & Loan, (2) fees 
for recording title and for an insurance policy and (3) the 
remainder of the funds to Joseph N. Cannon or as he 
directed. 
Scott Peatross, with the Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer, contacted Tommy Sisk of Stewart Title and scheduled 
August 18, 1980 as the time for closing.T. 216. The 
Plaintiff along with his interpreter, Emilio Ortiz, Tommy 
Sisk of Stewart Title Company, Scott Peatross of Bill Brown 
Realty, Joseph Cannon, Dorius Black, and Jack Rhodes and 
Vickie Phelps of Century 21-Harv Kirkpatrick were present. 
T.194,106. Because o£ a delay, Mrs. Phelps left before the 
closing actually took place and was replaced by Mr. Rhodes. 
T.279,244. 
The delay resulted from changes made at the 
request of Mr. Black at the time of closing as to where 
title would lie. T. 230,334. Each of the parties were 
explained the changes and were explained the documents 
conveying title to Mr. Cannon. Each party accepted the 
changes. T.229, 262, 320. Such changes at the time of 
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closing are usual in real estate transactions. T.230, 334. 
In addition, the substitution of Mr. Cannon as title holder 
complied with the provision of the Earnest Money Agreement 
to determine the title holder at the time of conveyance. T. 
217c Although Mr. Cannon maintained that he understood his 
role in the transaction to be that of a guarantor, he 
acknowledged signing the documents which clearly show the 
contrary. T. 93-99. There was no dispute as to their legal 
effect. 
The closing statements indicated that the 
$24,000.00 left owing was to be secured by a second deed of 
trust. Ex. 20 and 27. These documents were explained to the 
Plaintiff and it was discussed that the total of the first 
and second trust deeds would exceed the $44,000.00 sales 
price, although the exact figure was not known at that time. 
T. 213. The risk involved was explained to the Plaintiff by 
Mr. Sisk as well as the Plaintiff's agents. Although the 
risk was explained, it was generally assumed by the 
Plaintiff's agents that the first mortgage would not be an 
amount above $20,000. T. 251. Although this was assumed, 
the only representation made was that the buyer would borrov; 
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the $20,000.00 needed for the down pavment. T. 250. There 
was no limitation expressed in the Ernest Money Agreement or 
otherwise. T. 249/ 287. 
The note and Trust Deed in favor of the lender 
were prepared at the lender's office. T. 242. Stewart Title 
had nothing to do with the lender except as set forth in the 
letter of instructions. Stewart Title, in fact had no prior' 
conversations with anyone other than Scott Peatross who 
scheduled the closing. T. 228. The documents along with the 
check did not arrive until after the closincr had taken 
place. T. 2C8. Mr. Rhodes, the agent for the Plaintiff, 
waited around to see that they arrived but left before 
reviewing the documents. T. 264. There was no dispute as to 
the legal effect of the documents executed by the parties. 
Stewart Title proceeded according to the Ernest 
Money Agreement it received and the letter of instructions by 
recording a first Trust Deed in favor of the lender. T. 236. 
There was no objection by the Plaintiff's real estate agents 
to the Plaintiff's interest being secured by a second deed 
of trust. T. 2^1. In fact, an escrow account was set up to 
handle the second trust deed in favor of the Plaintiff. As 
-9-
part of the escrow instructions, the sellers representative 
was listed as Leonor C. Pagan, the Plaintiff's daughter. T. 
303. Ex. 16. 
Complying with the lender's instructions to 
protect its interest with a first trust deed, Stewart Title 
proceeded to disburse the funds as required. Each fee paid 
by Stewart Title was normal and customary. 
Having received the down payment, the Plaintiff 
left for Puerto Rico where he was summoned back by his 
interpreter, Emilio Ortiz, to instigate this lawsuit. The 
Plaintiff, having received a serious head injury from an 
industrial accident, was described as being of "low normal 
range" of intelligence. T. 66. Plaintiff's mental capacity 
is difficult to determine unless tested. T. 75. The 
Plaintiff was able to reach a settlement with Kennecott over 
his injury and to buy the home which is the subiect of the 
current action. T. 77. The Plaintiff had difficulty 
understanding English and was assisted in all aspects of the 
transaction by Emilio Ortiz, his interpreter. Everyone, 
including the Plaintiff's agents, felt and assumed that the 
Plaintiff understood and was competent to understand the 
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transaction he consumated. T. 267, 282, 374. 
The loan to Mr. Cannon for the purchase of the 
home was made when Mr. Cannon was in qood financial 
condition. T. 386, 389,39 4. The terms of the loan provided 
for five installments with a balloon payment for the full 
amount due in six months. T. 14 5. Such terms were customary 
for the type oE lender the Aopellant was and for the time 
the loan was made. T. 161, 392. The note subsequently came 
into default. 
Notice of default was mailed and Mr. Cannon asked 
for and received a couple of extensions. T. 163. Some 
payments were paid on the loan. However, the defaults 
continued and the property ultimately was foreclosed, with a 
deficiency being sought against Mr. Cannon. T. 166. 
With the foreclosure of the home, the Plaintiff 
brought this action. Although alleging a cause of action 
against the Appellant in his complaint, the Plaintiff 
testified that he did not claim a cause of action against 
the Appellant. T. 274. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The jury's finding that the Appellant conspired to 
defraud the Plaintiff is not supported by the direct 
evidence or by circumstantial evidence which can be 
reasonably and naturally inferred. The verdict is based 
solely on suspicion and on symoathy for the Plaintiff. The 
jury instructions on punitive damages introduced a 
conflicting standard of proof which was confusing and 
prejudicial to the ultimate finding of the underlying cause 
of action. 
ARGUMENT 
1 
Trit, VbKDICT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE 
The standard of review of a jury verdict has been 
stated by the court recently as follows: 
It is the exclusive province of a jury 
to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make 
findings of fact. (citation omitted). 
Where the evidence is conflicting and 
the jury is properly instructed, we do 
not upset those findings of fact except 
upon a showing that the evidence, viewed 
in the light most favorable to the 
verdict so clearly preponderated in 
Appellant's favor that reasonable 
persons could not differ on the outcome 
of the case. 
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Groen vs. Tri-O-Inc.yUtah, 667 P. 2d 598 (1983). See also 
£.A. Strout Western Realty vs. W. C. Foy & Sons,Utah, 66 5 
P. 2d 1320 (1983). 
The jury in the instant case found by special 
verdict that the lender, the Title Company and Joseph Cannon 
engaged in a civil conspiracy to defraud the Plaintiff of 
his home. To determine whether the evidence preponderated 
in lender's favor to where reasonable minds would not 
differ, requires that civil conspiracy and fraud be defined. 
A civil conspiracy has been defined as a 
combination of two or more persons by concerted action to 
accomplish an unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some 
purpose not in itself unlawful by unlawful means. ISA C.J.S. 
Conspiracy § 1 (1). In general, to constitute civil 
conspiracy there must be the following elements: 
(1) Two or more persons, and for this 
purpose a corporation is a person; (2) 
an object to be accomplished; (3) a 
meeting of minds on object or course of 
action; (4) one or more unlawful overt 
acts; and (5) damages as the proximate 
result thereof. 
ISA C.J.S. Conspiracy § 1 (2). 
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The Utah Supreme Court, in Crane Co, v. Dahle, 
Utah, 576 P 2d 870 (1978), set forth the elements as (1) 
wrongfully conspiring to violate the Plaintiff rights, (2) 
the carrying out of such plan; and (3) damages proximately 
caused thereby. The court further stated that the Plaintiff 
has the burden of proving civil conspiracy by clear and 
convincing evidence. Crane Co. at 872. 
Fraud is defined by the court In Taylor v. Gasor 
Inc., Utah, 607 P 2d 29 3 (1980), as follows: 
. . . the making of a false 
reoresentation concernina a presently 
existing material fact which the 
representor either knew to be false or 
made recklessly without sufficient 
knowledge, or the ommission of a 
material fact when there is a duty to 
disclose, for the purpose of inducinq 
action on the part of the other party, 
with actual, justifiable reliance 
resulting in damage to that party. 
As with civil conspiracy, the court held that a 
finding of fraud must be shown by clear and convincing proof 
and will not lie in mere suspicion or innuendo. 
Furthermore, a person cannot be liable for fraud unless he 
made the representation himself, authorized someone to make 
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it for him or participated in some way such as through 
conspiracy. 37 C.J.S. Fraud §61. 
In the present case, there is no direct evidence 
showing the Appellant misrepresented a material fact known 
to be false. There is no direct evidence showing that the 
lender acted for the purpose of inducing the Plaintiff to 
sell his home or that the Plaintiff justifiably relied upon 
the lender's actions. Since the lender did not, by its own 
actions, defraud the Plaintiff or authorize another, the 
lender's liability can only be established through some 
participation in a fraud such as in a civil consoiracy. 
The facts established by the Plaintiff don't 
support the allegation of a civil conspiracy. Ihe lender's 
acts were lawful and were conducted for a lawful purpose. 
The evidence showed that, other than providing the 
financing, the lender did not participate in the plan of Mr. 
Black to purchase the Plaintiff's home. There were no 
misrepresentations or omissions shown to have been made by 
Mr. Cannon through Mr. Black or by Mr. Sisk. The asumptions 
of the Plaintiffs agents were never expressed nor made known 
to the parties. Because of this, the jury's finding of 
-15-
conspiracy to defraud can only rest on inferences drawn from 
the facts proven. 
The Appellant recoanizes that inferences play an 
important role in any findings of fact, especially in cases 
such as this. Inferences, however, must be reasonably and 
legitimately drawn. This is particularly so in cases of 
fraud. See 37 C.J. S. Fraud § 115. Inferences must be made 
for the purpose of aidina reason and not to override it. 
They are nothing more than the probable and natural 
explanation of the facts. Holland vs. Columbia Mining 
Co.,4 Utah 2d 303, 29 3 P?d 700 (1956). 
In Holland, the court was faced with an appeal 
of a ruling on Summary Judgment that there was not a 
fraudulent conspiracy in the business transactions between 
the parties. After addressing the issue of inferences, the 
court stated the following: 
Common sense and reason dictate that 
evil inferences should not be permitted 
to be drawn from routine business 
transactions where there are no other 
circumstances. To hold otherwise would 
throw the door open for attack on each 
and every transaction that one might 
enter into. 
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In the present case, the inferences were not 
reasonably and legitimately drawn. The result reached by 
the jury is not probable nor a natural explanation of the 
facts proven. This conclusion is supported by the following 
reasons. 
1. The lender had been in contact with Mr. Black, 
Mr. Cannon and Mr. Sisk. These were purely business 
contacts. Mr. Black inquired of the availability of a loan 
to purchase the Plaintiff's home. A loan was extended to 
Mr. Cannon on the basis of the application and financial 
statements which he had filled out. Contact with Mr. Sisk 
occurred when the loan and letter of instructions were 
delivered to Stewart Title on the day of the closing. While 
the lender's contacts with Mr. Black and Mr. Cannon were 
before the date of closing, those contacts were after Mr. 
Black had negotiated for the purchase of Plaintiff's home. 
Mr. Black testified that the lender was not involved with 
his and Mr. Cannon's plans for the purchase of the home. 
These contacts are not enouqh to infer fraud. 
2. The lender had dealt with Mr. Black before. 
This fact explains the reason for the referral of Mr. Cannon 
-17-
for the loan* The success of a business depends to a large 
degree on the returning customer* Evil inferences here are 
improper. 
3. The lender loaned Mr. Cannon $32,325.00 for 
the purchase of Plaintiff's property. The Plaintiff's 
agents felt that this was a substantial deviation of the 
Plaintiff's agreement. Even if it were a deviation, the 
lender had no way of knowing of the deviation. There was no 
limitation of the amount to be borrowed put into writing in 
the agreement as should have been done by Plaintiff's 
agents. Furthermore, there was no representation to the 
Plaintiff that the amount borrowed on the property would be 
limited. Any "deviation" resulted from a misunderstanding 
between buyer and seller. The only representation mede was 
that the $20,000.00 down payment would have to be borrowed. 
The lender was never notified of any limitation whatsoever 
on the property. It's loan was based on representations 
made on Mr. Cannon's application and on the value of the 
security. The lender acted lawfully. Other inferences 
simply are unreasonable. 
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4. The letter of instructions which accompanied 
the loan check to Stewart Title required that fee simole 
title be in the name of Joseph N. Cannon and that the lender 
be secured by a first trust deed. This requirement does not 
indicate that the lender was trying to cheat the Plaintiff 
out of his property, but rather to protect its interests in 
the property which was being used as security for the loan 
which was made. Such practice is usual in the banking 
industry. The inference of fraud is an unnatural 
explanation of the facts. 
5. The letter of instructions also required 
$4,848.75 to be paid back to the lender. This fact is 
perhaps the only fact where an evil inference could be 
drawn. However, even here there is a more reasonable and 
natural explanation. It was testified that finders fees 
were paid for loans which resulted from referrals. It was 
testified that it was probable that this amount was paid as 
a finders fee to Mr. Black and was credited against 
obligations he owed to the lender. The amount was paid by 
Alpha Leasing at the direction of Mr. Cannon whose business 
dealings with Mr. Black in no way involved the lender. 
-19-
6. The Plaintiff was of low intelligence. 
Plaintiff's doctor testified that this fact could only be 
determined through testing. All those who had dealt with 
the Plaintiff, including his own real estate agents, felt 
that the Plaintiff understood and was competent to enter 
into the subject transaction. Even if the Plaintiff's mental 
capacity could be determined by observation, the lender 
could not have known since it never met nor was involved 
with the Plaintiff. Evil inferences here are improper. 
7. Certain sums were deducted from the 
Plaintiff's down payment and paid to the real estate agents 
and Stewart Title. These amounts were explained by Stewart 
Title and testified as being the usual and customary 
practice of the real estate business. There was nothing 
improper here to infer the jury's finding. 
8. At the time of closing, Mr. Cannon was 
substituted as buyer. This substitution is clear on the 
documents and was done according to the express provision of 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase. This fact was 
also explained to each party. The lender had nothing to do 
-20-
with the change other than lending the money to Mr. Cannon 
as the buyer. 
9. The Plaintiff was not made aware of the changes 
made at the time of closing. The evidence shows that the 
documents clearly indicated that Mr. Cannon was the buyer 
and that the remaining obligation owed to the Plaintiff: was 
secured bv a second trust deed. The legal effect of the 
documents executed by the parties was not disputed. 
Discussions were held between the Plaintiff and Mr. Sisk and 
Mr. Rhodes, the agent for the Plaintiff, concerning the risk 
involved in such a transaction. The evidence shows that 
an explanation or at least an opportunity to be explained 
existed but that the Plaintiff simply did not understand. 
This is underscored by the escrow documents which listed 
Plaintiff's daughter as representative. Although there mav 
have been misunderstanding, information was in fact going 
back and forth. 
10. The trust deed in favor of the lender was 
drafted ana signed outside of the Plaintiff's presence. 
This was the usual practice in that the transaction between 
-21-
Mr. Cannon and tne lender was a separate transaction from 
that between Mr. Cannon and the Plaintiff. 
11. The funds received from the lender were 
disbursed after the closing had taken place. This was 
testified to as being the usual practice. There was no 
objection indicated by the Plaintiff or his agents. In 
fact, Mr. Rhodes waited around until the check arrived from 
the lender but did not take the time to review the 
documentation. 
12. The loan to Mr. Cannon was payable in six 
months. This type of loan was not unusual for the type of 
lending institution that the Appellant wa? and for the time 
that the loan was made. Mr. Cannon testified that at the 
time the loan was made, he could financially meet the terms. 
A foreclosure sale did not immediately follow the defaults 
as Mr. Cannon was allowed to extend the loan. The Appellant 
did not agree to extend the loan with the thought of 
immediately foreclosing Plaintiff's interest in the 
property. Some payments were made by Mr. Cannon on the 
loan. 
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The only inference which can reasonably be drawn 
from these facts is that the lender was used by Mr. Black 
and Mr. Cannon to fund part of: their business ventures which 
ultimately soured. Any other finding simply is not 
reasonable based on the evidence. This is particularly so 
given the fact that the Plaintiff himself testified that he 
did not have a cause of action against the Appellant. The 
evil inferences drawn by the jury are at most suspicion and 
suspicion is not enough to support an inference of fraud. 
One may only assume that they used the "deep pocket" theory 
in their judgment. Even at that, the suspicions do not 
reasonably and naturally follow the facts proven. The 
verdict rendered by the jury clearly was an act of sympathy 
for the Plaintiff who was continuously described as being 
physically and mentally impaired and who did net understand 
the english language. While sympathy may be warranted for 
the Plaintiff, the verdict is not. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WhEN IT DENIED ThE 
MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING VERDICT. 
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The Appellant recognizes that the right of trial 
by jury is one which should be safeguarded by the courts. 
There are, however, circumstances where the issues of fact 
should be taken from the jury. This Court has set forth 
those circumstances as follows. 
. . . In ruling on motions which take 
issues of fact from the jury (this 
includes both motions for directed 
verdict and judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict), the trial court if obligated 
to look at the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences that fairly may be 
drawn therefrom in the light favorable 
to the party moved against? and the 
granting of such a motion is justified 
only if, in so viewing the evidence, 
there is no substantial basis therein 
which would support a verdict in his 
favor. 
Mel Hardman Prod. Inc. vs. Robinson, Utah, 604 P 2d 913, 
(1979). Management Committee, Etc. vs. Graystone Pines, 
Utah, 652 P 2d 896 (1982) . 
In the present case, the evidence was not 
sufficient for the reasons argued above. As a result, the 
Plaintiff failed to establish his prima facie case against 
the Appellant. The elements of both fraud and conspiracy 
were not established by evidence which was clear and 
convincing. Therefore, as a matter of law, there could not 
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be a finding of conspiracy to defraud the Plaintiff and his 
cause of action must fail. This result is underscored by 
the fact that the Plaintiff, under oathf testified that he 
did not make any claim against the Appellant, This case 
should not have been allowed to go before the jury . The 
trial court was incorrect when it ruled that the Appellant's 
motions to take the case from the jury were resolved by the 
return of the jury's verdict. i--: jury's verdict does not 
change Plaintiff's testimony or the lack cE a prima facie 
case. 
II£ 
THE COURT ERRED lis INSTRUCTING THE JURY 
ThAT PUMTIVb DAMAGES CAN BE FOUL\D ON A 
DIFFERENT STANDARD OF PROOF ThAN THE 
UNDERLYING OiRONGbUL ACT COMPLAINED OF. 
Punitive damages are awarded only where the nature 
of the wrong complained of goes beyond merely violating the 
rights of another. For an award of punitive damages to be 
proper, the wrongful act complained of must be characterized 
by some circumstance of aggravation such as conduct which is 
willful, malicious or in knowing or reckless disregard for 
the rights of others. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills hospital 
Inc.,Utah, 675 P2d 1179 (1983).Leigh Furniture & Carpet 
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Co. vs. Isom,Utah, 675 P2d 29 3 (1982). 72 Am. Jur. 2d 
damages § 246. 
Even in cases of fraud. Punitive damages are the 
exception. The basic elements of fraud, as indicated above, 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence and not 
by mere susicipion or innuendo. Punitive damages may be 
awarded in such cases of fraud where there is, in addition 
to the basic elements of fraud, "other extraordinary or 
exceptional circumstances clearlv indicatino malice or 
willfulness." 37 C.J.S. Fraud §144 (emohases added). 
In the present case, the trial court instructed 
the jury in instructions Nos. 21, 26, and 27 that punitive 
damages could be found from a preponderance of the evidence 
that the Defendant's conduct was willful and malicious in 
conspiring to defraud the Plaintiff. Since punitive damages 
are the exception, even in cases of fraud, the basis for the 
award must be found in additional facts above and beyond the 
elements of the underlying wrongful act. Because of this, 
the standard of proof for the findings upon which the award 
of punitive damages is based must coincide with the standard 
of proof necessary for a finding of the underlying wrongful 
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act. In this case, the underlying wrongful act is 
conspiracy to defraud which must be found by clear and 
convincing evidence. The court's use of the preponderance 
standard in this instance was at the least, confusing to the 
jury and, at most, prejudicial in the jury's awardinq 
compensatory damaaes on the Plaintiff's cause of action. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury verdict awarding the Plaintiff 
compensatory and punitive damages must be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 12th day of March, 
1985. 
JENSEN & LEWIS, P.C. 
"OLSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
/V £JJW*J MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and Correct copy of 
the foregoing Appellant's Brief was mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Mark S. Miner, 525 Newhcuse Building, 10 Exchange Place, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 12^ day of March, 1985. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ISRAEL PAGAN, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
JOSEPH N. CANNON, DORIUS 
BLACK, ALPHA LEASING 
COMPANY, a partnership, 
ROBERTG D. APGOOD, JOSEPH 
N. CANNON, DORIUS BLACK 
and RICHARD McKEAN doing 
business under the name and 
style of Alpha Leasing 
Company, BILL BROWN REALTY, 
INCORPORATED, SCOTT PEATROSS, 
individually, STEWART TITLE 
COMPANY OF UTAH, TOMMY W. 
SISK, CAPITOL THRIFT & 
LOAN, a financial 
corporation, BACKMAN 
TITLE COMPANY, a financial 
corporation, and MERLYN 
HANKS, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. C-82-5710 
JUDGE FREDERICK 
We, the jury in the above case, find the following: 
1. Did Capitol Thrift & Loan Company, through its 
agent, Merlyn Hanks, by clear and convincing evidence engage 
in a civil conspiracy to defraud plaintiff incident to the 
transaction in question? 
X. 
Yes N No 
2. Did Stewart Title Company of Utah, through its 
agent, Tommy W. Sisk, by clear and convincing evidence engage 
in a civil conspiracy to defraud plaintiff incident to the 
transaction in question? 
Yes No 
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3. Was Scott Peatross, at the time in question, 
an agent of Bill Brown Realty, Inc.? 
& Yes No 
4. If you answered No. 3 above "yes", then answer 
this question: 
Did Bill Brown Realty, Inc., through its agent, 
Scott Peatross, by clear and convincing evidence engage in a 
civil conspiracy to defraud plaintiff incident to the transaction 
in question? 
Yes No 
5. If you answered No. 3 above "no", then answer 
this question: 
Did Scott Peatross, individually, by clear and 
convincing evidence, engage in a civil conspiracy to defraud 
plaintiff incident to the transaction in question? 
-^r Yes 
6. Was Joseph Cannon, at the time in question, 
an agent of Alpha Leasing Company? 
x Yes No 
7. If you answered No. 5 above "yes", then answer 
this question: 
Did Alpha Leasing Company, through its agent, 
Joseph Cannon, by clear and convincing evidence engage in a 
civil conspiracy to defraud plaintiff incident to the trans-
action in question? 
Yes No 
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8. If you answered No* #?above "no", then answer 
tnis question: 
Did Joseph Cannon, individually, by clear and 
convincing evidence, engage in a civil conspiracy to defraud 
plaintiff incident to the transaction in question? 
x 
Yes N No 
9. Was Richard McKean, at the time in question, 
an agent of Alpha Leasing Company? 
x Yes x No 
10. If you answered No. 7 above "yes", then answer 
this question: 
Did Alpha Leasing Company, through its agent, 
Richard McKean, by clear and convincing evidence engage in a 
civil conspiracy to defraud plaintiff incident to the trans-
action in question? 
ac 
Yes No 
11. If you found by clear and convincing evidence 
that Capitol Thrift & Loan Company, through its agent, Merlyn 
Hanks, engaged in a civil conspiracy to defraud the plaintiff 
incident to the transaction in question, what damage, if any, do 
you find was caused to the plaintiff: 
Compensatory $ / A C T O (not to exceed $24,000.00) 
Punitive $ Lfp-e1^) ^ 
12. If you found by clear and convincing evidence 
that Stewart Title Company of Utah, through its agent, Tommy 
Sisk, engaged in a civil conspiracy to defraud the plaintiff 
incident to the transaction in question, what damage, if any, do 
you find was caused to the plaintiff: 
Compensatory $ (not to exceed $24,000.00) 
Punitive $ ^ ^ V 7 * 
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13. If you found by clear and convincing evidence that 
Bill Brown Realty, Inc., through its agent, Scott Peatross, 
engaged in a civil conspiracy to defraud the plaintiff incident 
to the transaction in question, what damage, if any, do you find 
was caused to the plaintiff: 
Compensatory $ ' t (not to exceed $24,000.00) 
Punitive $ 
14. If you found by clear and convincing evidence that 
Scott Peatross, individually, engaged in a civil conspiracy to 
defraud the plaintiff incident to the transaction in question, 
what damage, if any, do you find was caused to the plaintiff: 
Compensatory $ — (not to exceed $24,000.00) 
Punitive $ 
15. If you found by clear and convincing evidence 
that Alpha Leasing Company, through its agent, Joseph Cannon, 
engaged in a civil conspiracy to defraud the plaintiff incident 
to the transaction in question, what damage, if any, do you find 
was caused to the plaintiff: 
Compensatory $ •—r^ (not to exceed $24,000.00) 
Punitive $ * ""~ 
16. If you found by clear and convincing evidence 
that Joseph Cannon, individually, engaged in a civil conspiracy 
to defraud the plaintiff incident to the transaction in question, 
what damaqe, if any, do you find was caused to the plaintiff: 
Compensatory $ / 3^ C-F~f" (not to exceed $24,000.00) 
Punitive $ if Q€H° 
17. If you found by clear and convincing evidence 
that Alpha Leasing Company, through its agent, Richard McKean, 
engaged in a civil conspiracy to defraud the plaintiff incident 
to the transaction in question, what damage, if any, do you find 
was caused to the plaintiff: 
Compensatory*- $ - (not to exceed $24,000.00) 
Punitive $ 
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18. If you found by clear and convincing evidence 
that Richard McKean, individually, engaged in a civil conspiracy 
to defraud the plaintiff incident to the transaction in question, 
wnat damage, if any, do you find was caused to the plaintiff: 
Compensatory $ - (not to exceed $24,000.00) 
Punitive $ 
DATED this £L L/ day of August, 1984. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ISRAEL PAGAN 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH N. CANNON, DORIUS 
BLACK, ALPHA LEASING COMPANY, 
a partnership, ROBERT D. 
APGOOD, JOSEPH N. CANNON, 
DORIUS BLACK, and RICHARD 
McKEAN, doing business under 
the name and style of ALPHA 
LEASING COMPANY, BILL BROWN 
REALTY, INCORPORATED, SCOTT 
PEATROSS, personally, STEWART 
TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH, TOMMY 
W. SISK, CAPITOL THRIFT AND 
LOAN, a financial corporation; 
BACKMAN TITLE COMPANY, a 
financial corporation, and 
MERLYN HANKS, 
Defendants. 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before the Court sitting with a jury on August 21-24, 1984, the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, District Judge, presiding. The 
plaintiff, ISRAEL PAGAN, was represented by his counsel, Mark 
S. Miner. The defendants JOSEPH N. CANNON, ALPHA LEASING 
COMPANY, a partnership, and RICHARD McKEAN were represented by 
JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT 
Civil No. C-82-5710 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
their counsel, Richard N. Cannon. BILL BROWN REALTY, 
INCORPORATED, and SCOTT PEATROSS were represented by their 
counsel, Duane A. Burnett. STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH and 
TOMMIE W. SISK were represented by their counsel, Robert D. 
Merrill- CAPITOL THRIFT AND LOAN and MERLYN HANKS were 
represented by their counsel, Kay M. Lewis. ROBERT D. APGOOD 
was represented by his counsel, Richard I. Ashton and Thomas Rc 
Vuksinick. The defendant DORIUS BLACK, having not been duly 
served with summons and complaint in this matter, did not 
appear other than as a witness and did not otherwise 
participate in the trial. 
At the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, 
it was stipulated by, between and among the parties that the 
complaint could be dismissed with prejudice as against the 
defendants ROBERT D. APGOOD, TOMMIE W. SISK and MERLYN HANKS. 
With respect to plaintiff's remaining claims against 
the defendants, the jury answered special interrogatories and 
rendered its verdict on August 24, 1984. Following the 
announcement of the verdict, the Court heard and duly 
considered various motions by the defendants for the entry of 
judgments notwithstanding the verdict and the Court having 
determined and ruled that said motions should be denied, it is 
therefore, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
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1. Plaintiff's complaint against the defendants 
ROBERT D. APGOOD, TOMMIE W. SISK and MERLYN HANKS be and the 
same is hereby dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action. 
2. Plaintiff's complaint against the defendants BILL 
BROWN REALTY, INCORPORATED, SCOTT PEATROSS and ALPHA LEASING 
COMPANY be and it is hereby dismissed with prejudice, no cause 
of action, 
3. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against CAPITOL 
THRIFT AND LOAN in the amount of $12,000.00 compensatory 
damages, and $4,000.00 punitive damages. 
4. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the 
defendant STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH in the amount of no 
compensatory damages and $2,000.00 punitive damages. 
5. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the 
defendant JOSEPH N. CANNON in the amount of $12,000.00 
compensatory damages, and $4,000.00 punitive damages. 
MADE AND ENTERED this day of , 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
J. Dennis Frederick 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SERVED the foregoing Judgment on Verdict by mailing a 
copy thereof, postage prepaid, to the following this day 
of August, 1984: 
Duane A* Burnett, Esq. 
Attorney for Bill Brown 
Realty and Scott 
Peatross 
P. 0. Box 27 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Mark S. Miner, Esq0 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
525 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Richard I. Ashton, Esq. and 
Thomas R. Vuksinick, Esq. 
57 West 200 South, 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Kay M. Lewis, Esq. 
Attorneys for 
Capitol Thrift and Loan 
and Merlyn Hanks 
320 So. 300 East, Suite 1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Richard No Cannon, Esq. 
Attorney for Joseph N0 Cannon 
431 South 300 East 
Suite 106 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dorius Black 
Cascade Drive 
Morgan, Utah 84050 
YA-A^JC> 
Robert D. Merrill 
5953M 
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Under the law, it does not necessarily follow from a 
finding that one member of a partnership is liable for punitive 
damages that any or all of other members of the partnership are 
also liable for punitive damages. The acts or omissions of one 
partner will justify an award of punitive damages against 
another partner or partners if and only if those acts or 
omissions are within the ordinary course and scope of part-
nership business and the other partner or partners against 
punitive damages are awarded authroized, participated in, or 
ratified those acts or omissions• 
If you find that the acts or omissions of Joseph N. Cannoi 
justify an award of punitive damages against him, punitive 
damages may be awarded agains the other partners of Alpha Leas-
ing if, and only if, you find by the preponderance of the le pr< 
evidence each of the following elements: 
1. That at the time of the events at which this 
lawsuit occurred Joseph N. Cannon was acting as a 
partner of Alpha Leasing Company; 
2. That the acts of Joseph N. Cannon were within the 
ordinary course and scope of Alpha Leasing's business; 
3. That each of the partners against whom punitive 
damages are awarded sought, authorized, participated 
in, or ratified the acts or omissions of Joseph 
N. Cannon. 
INSTRUCTION NO • ^ 
In addition to the actual damages plaintiff alleges 
he has sustianed, he also seeks to recover punitive or exemplary 
damages against the defendants. If you find the issues in 
favor of the plaintiff and that he is entitled to recover 
actual damages, you may also consider whether the plaintiff 
is entitled to such punitive damages. 
Before punitive damages may be awarded, you must find 
the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the individual 
defendants, and further you must find f orm >arpreponderance of% 
the evidence that the individual defendantsf conduct in injuring 
the plaintiff was willfull and malicious. If 'you so find, 
you may award, if you deem it proper to do so, such sum as 
in your judgment would be reasonable and proper as a punish-
ment to that defendant for such wrongs, and as a wholesome 
warning to others not to offend in like manner. If such 
punitive damages are given, you should award them with 
caution and you should keep in mind that they are only for the 
purpose just mentioned and are not the measure of actual damage. 
Such damages must not exceed the amount prayed for by the 
plaintiff. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. J?*? 
If you find that plaintiff suffered damage as a proxi-
mate result of the conduct of any of the defendants on which 
you base a finding of liability, you may then consider whether 
you should award punitive or exemplary damages against such 
defendant for the sake of example and by way of punishment* 
You may in your discretion award such damages, if, but cr.Iy 
if, you find^y a preponderance "of the evidence that said 
defendant's acts were wilful or malicious in the conduce en 
which you base your finding of liability. 
In arriving at any award of punitive damagesf you 
are to consider the following: 
1. The reprehensibility of the conduct of the defen-
dant. 
2. The amount of punitive damages which will have a 
deterrent effect on the defendant. 
3. That the punitive damages must bear a reasonable 
relation to the actual damages. 
/ 
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